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ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS
BRINGING LAW TO SENTENCING
David Boerner*

When the American Bar Association adopted its
first Sentencing Standards' in 1968, sentencing in the
United States was, to use Judge Frankel's term,2
"lawless." Those initial Standards, while firmly
committed to indeterminacy and judicial discretion,
contained the essential prerequisites for bringing law
to sentencing. They recommended that sentencing
judges "normally should state for the record in the
presence of the defendant the reasons for selecting the
particular sentence to be imposed,"3 and called for the
"development of sentencing criteria"4 and for
appellate review of sentences.5
When the ABA revisited its Sentencing Standards
in 1979, it rejected the statutory determinate sentencing reforms which had been adopted in a number of
states in the 1970s and followed the lead of those who
advocated reform based on presumptive guidelines
developed by a commission. The 1979 Standards
retained their commitment to indeterminacy but
called for the creation of a "guideline drafting agency
...empowered to promulgate presumptively
appropriate sentencing ranges." 6 It recommended
judges impose sentences "within the applicable
guideline range unless... a substantial aggravating
or mitigating circumstance exists," 7 a structure which
has become the model for all sentencing reforms
enacted since 1980.
The sentencing reform movement, to say the
least, has not been free of controversy and the ABA's
1993 Sentencing standards reflect the controversy.
The Standards seek to distance themselves from the
federal sentencing guidelines-unpopular among
judges, lawyers and academics-while simultaneously advocating the adoption of a sentencing
reform modeled on the state guideline systems. This
is no small feat, one that requires considerably more
than merely banishing the word "guidelines" from
the lexicon. The problem is that the federal and the
various state guidelines systems are structurally very
similar. The differences are in their details and in the
sentencing policies they seek to implement. The
devil, of course, is always in the details, and there is
much to criticize in the federal guidelines.
The core of the controversy, however, lies
deeper. What makes sentencing guidelines inherently
controversial is that they bring law to sentencing.
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Law does not comfortably permit the multiple
simultaneous inconsistent resolution of issues. Its
hierarchy forces the resolution of issues of sentencing
policy-and enforces the particular resolution--and
thus makes the fact of resolution clear. This society is
not of one mind on what values sentencing should
embody and thus the resolution of these disputed
issues means the values of some will prevail while
those of others will not.
Ironically it is the growing awareness that
sentencing guidelines are a remarkably effective
means of translating policy judgments into practice
that fuels the controversy. As Michael Tonry concludes "[g]uidelines promulgated by commissions
have altered sentencing patterns and practices,
reduced sentencing disparities and gender and race
effects, and shown that sentencing policies can be
linked to correctional and other resources, thereby
enhancing governmental accountability and protecting the public purse."8 Reduced to its essence the
controversy is over the wisdom of those "altered
sentencing patterns and practices."
There are no new issues in sentencing. Every
issue which the various guidelines address was an
issue before sentencing guidelines. The difference
was that before guidelines the issue was resolved by
each individual judge, acting alone, most often
silently, without reference to any external standard
and without possibility of review. That the same
issue, arising in cases before different judges, would
be resolved differently was inevitable. Were the
issues exclusively those of fact, individual resolution
would be inevitable and thus tolerable. But where the
issue is whether a particular fact ought to be considered at all or whether it should aggravate or mitigate
the sentence, disparity of resolution resulted in
disparate sentences, not because the defendants were
different, not because the crimes were different, but
because the sentencing judges were different.
This core truth-and its unacceptabilityunderlies the movement to bring law to sentencing.
Despite all the sound and fury surrounding the
federal sentencing guidelines, the ABA remains
committed to this reform. Its 1993 Standards, both
structurally, and substantively, are wholly consistent
with the fundamental core of the reform project,
bringing law to sentencing.
The Standards make perhaps their greatest
contribution by separating the structure of sentencing
from the sentencing policies those structures are
designed to implement. The failure to make this
separation characterizes the acrimonious debate over
the federal sentencing guidelines and is, in my
judgment, the greatest impediment to continued
efforts to bring law to sentencing. Our discourseand our decisions-will improve if we all focus on the
same issues. But the controversy will remain.
Take the debate over whether the defendant's
personal characteristics that are not related to the
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offense ought to be relevant in sentencing. The
United States Sentencing Commission was making a
choice when it proclaimed that most personal
characteristics are "not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
9
applicable sentencing range." The Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission made a similar
choice when, exercising delegated legislative power, it
declared that "employment" and "Social factors,
including: (1) educational attainment; (2) living
arrangements at the time of offense or sentencing; (3)
0
length of residence; (4) marital status" were impermissible grounds for departure. So did Washington's
Legislature when it declared "The sentencing guidelines ... will apply equally to offenders in all parts of
the state, without discrimination as to any element
that does not relate to the crime or the previous
record of the defendant.""
The ABA Standards make a different choice when
they recommend "The legislature should authorize
sentencing courts, sentencing individual offenders, to
take into account personal characteristics not material
to their culpability that may justify imposition of a
different type of sanction or, in limited circumstances,
a sentence of lesser severity than otherwise would be
imposed."1 2 It would be naive to expect agreement on
this issue. Legislatures will undoubtedly resolve it
differently. We should not be surprised when
sentencing commissions develop guidelines which
reflect the values of the legislative bodies which
created them. This explains much of the reviled
3
features of current federal sentencing law.' What law
demands, and delivers, is that the choice, once made,
be respected.
Sentencing guidelines also bring law-and thus
constraint-to sentencing in a more indirect way.
Every jurisdiction which has implemented presumptive sentencing guidelines has recognized that not
every factor which would justify departure can be
specified in advance. To accommodate this they have
stated the standard for departure in general terms,
accompanied it with a non-exclusive list of permissible factors, and authorized the judiciary to develop,
in a common-law fashion, other grounds for departure.
The ABA Standards wisely follow this model by
proposing that departures be allowed for "substantial
reasons."" The reporters state that this "is intended
to be more permissive than the current federal
departure standard, and is modelled after the states
that have preserved meaningful judicial discretion
under guidelines."' 5 While meaningfulness is always
in the eye of the beholder, the experience in the
guideline states is that this type of standard, while
preserving and employing judicial discretion at the
appellate level, will ultimately constrain sentencing
discretion.
Under the similar "substantial and compelling"
departure standard in both Minnesota and Washing-

ton the issue of whether a particular reason is
"substantial and compelling" is determined by the
6
appellate court as a matter of law. While this
determination inevitably involves judicial discretion,
once resolved at the appellate level sentencing judges
are bound. Appellate courts in both states have not
been reluctant to reverse sentencing judges whose
reasons for departure are, in the appellate courts'
judgment, inconsistent with the policy articulated by
the legislature. 7 This, of course, is the standard
conception of the judicial role. Allowing a sentencing
judge's "concept of just punishment"" to prevail over
the appellate courts' determination of the legislature's
conception would be lawless.
Once the inevitability of the process of controversy and resolution inherent in the concept of law is
accepted, the real work of substantive sentencing
reform can begin. While the 1993 Standards do not
recommend particular resolutions of all basic policy
issues, they do recommend particular resolutions of a
number of specific issues which, by focusing attention
on the detail, will greatly assist those considering
adoption of presumptive sentencing systems.
Consider for example the question of prior
criminal history. The 1979 Standards, while obviously
19
intending that prior record be considered, offered
no guidance on how that consideration should be
given. Undoubtedly reflecting experience with
guidelines over the past decade, the 1993 Standards
recommend that sentences be enhanced based on the
"number and nature of prior convictions and the time
elapsed since an offender's most recent prior conviction and completion of service of sentence," and "that
"time periods" should be fixed, "after which
offender's prior convictions may not be taken into
20
account."
The limitation to convictions follows the lead of
all states which have adopted guidelines and rejects
the federal guidelines authorization of the consideration of "prior similar adult criminal conduct not
1
resulting in a criminal conviction." 2 While the
Standards identify the relevant factors, they offer no
recommendations as to how a sentencing system
might "guide sentencing courts to the appropriate
weight to be given to an offender's criminal history."' Here existing guidelines systems provide
models to which policymakers may profitably turn as
they craft their system.
All existing systems employ variable weights but
the federal guidelines focus on the length of the prior
sentence. Minnesota, Oregon, Louisiana and Pennsylvania focus on the severity of the crime for which
the offender was previously convicted and Washington and Louisiana consider both the severity of the
crime of conviction and its similarly to the current
conviction. Similarly, while all systems except
Pennsylvania and Louisiana provide that at least
some prior convictions are not considered after the
passage of some period of time, they vary widely in
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what length of time is appropriate and in whether
there are any prior convictions which must always be
considered.
The point is not that any particular resolution is
best, but that resolution of issues on this level of detail
is inevitable in every sentencing. There are arguments for each particular resolution. Are there any
arguments for the multiple simultaneous inconsistent
resolutions that are inevitable in a system which
leaves resolution of the issue to the unguided
discretion of the sentencing judge?
Of all the issues of sentencing reform, none is
more important than breaking our single-minded
focus on a term of incarceration as the primary
sentence. Existing guidelines describe presumptive
sentences almost exclusively in terms of imprisonment. While some systems authorize the use of
alternative sentences, the dominate message of
existing guidelines is that only imprisonment is
punishment.
Here the ABA Standards offer a significant
advance. The Standards describe in considerable
detail the range of sanctions they recommend that
legislatures authorize. Their recommended sanctions
are the building blocks with which one could construct a sophisticated and sensitive sentencing system
and thus they will be of considerable assistance. The
Standards do not, however, take the necessary next
step and address the complex but essential question
of interchangeability. The standards call for the
sentencing commission to "direct sentencing courts to
the types of sanctions and severity of sanction" which
are "presumptively appropriate" 23 but offer no
guidance as to how this vital but maddeningly
difficult process is to be performed.
Any system concerned with defining and
reducing unwarranted disparity must grapple with
the concept of interchangeability. Modest starts have
been made in some guideline systems but much
heavy lifting remains. As Norval Morris' and
Michael Tonry's path-breaking book Between Prison
and Probation makes clear, this issue is laden with
value judgments but its promise is enormous. Morris
and Tonry understand that at the core of this project
is the inherently political task of developing "a
system of interchangeable punishments that the state
and the offender would regard as comparable in their
punitive effects on him."24 No system of "intermediate" or "alternative" punishments can be successfully
implemented or maintained if it is perceived as unjust
by the public. I say the public, not judges, lawyers or
academics, because that is where political power
ultimately resides in a popular democracy.
My experience with sentencing teaches me that
the public has a deep, perhaps pre-rational, commitment to equal treatment. While I agree with Morris
and Tonry that "precise equivalency.., is in practice
unattainable and is in theory undesirable,"" the

burden is on the proponents of "rough equivalence"
to persuade the public and their surrogates, legislatures and "intermediate agencies," that the resulting
sentences are just in both the individual case and
between cases.
The meta-message of sentencing reform over the
past quarter century is that law can come to sentencing and that when it does it will bring its partnerpolitics. While expertise is indispensable, public
acceptability is the cornerstone upon which the
success of any sentencing system will depend.
The federal sentencing guidelines, reviled as they
are by the "experts," have proven as stable as their
state analogs. No presumptive sentencing system has
been repealed or even structurally modified in any
significant way. The reason, I suggest, is that the
public, acting through their elected representatives,
see those guidelines, and the sentences imposed
pursuant to them, as roughly just.
That those sentences are considerably harsher
than most who read this journal, including this
author, see as just is, to put the matter bluntly,
irrelevant. The hope, and it could never have been
more than a hope, that sentencing commissions would
serve to blunt the raw force of public opinion now
appears naive. The experience in Minnesota and
Washington, progressive states generally regarded as
having the most successful guidelines systems, teach
that while those systems were effective at restraining
the growth of prison populations when that was the
policy of those states, they were equally effective at
implementing policy judgments that more punitive
sentences were appropriate. The analogy is that of the
sea-anchor, effective at keeping the ship heading into
the wind, but entirely subject to sea changes.
Churchill was right, of course, when he said
almost a century ago, "The mood and temper of the
public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals
is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of
any country."' We have the sentences we have
because we have chosen to have them. Presumptive
sentencing guidelines give us the means to transform
our values concerning sentences into practice, they help
in assuring that those values are evenly applied, but
they cannot transcend our values. We live in a punitive
time and thus we have punitive sentences.
Those of us who believe in less punitive sentencing policies have much work to do, and most of that
work, like most politics, is local. In Judge Frankel's
words it is time to "fall to and work."' While what
takes place in federal courts is important, sentencing
is overwhelmingly a state concern and thus most of
the work will take place in state capitols, not on the
banks of the Potomac. The ABA knows this and that
is why it continues on its now quarter-century
struggle to bring law to sentencing. Its work will be
of a great benefit as the project of bringing an end to
"lawlessness in sentencing"' inevitably continues.
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